Sunday, January 18, 2009

Termination of Parental Rights in Texas



A parent's rights to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children are constitutional interests far more precious than any property right. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982); In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003).


While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).


In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to end them permanently and to divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child's right to inherit. TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANN. Sec.161.206(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).


Texas courts strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20-21; In re E.M.N., 221 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2007, no pet.). In proceedings to terminate the parent‑child relationship brought under section 161.001 of the family code, the petitioner (typically the State of Texas) must establish one ground listed under subdivision (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANN. ' 161.001; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Both elements must be established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).


Termination of parental rights is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the petitioner to justify termination by clear and convincing evidence. TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANN. '' 161.001, 161.206(a); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the beyond the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2006, pet. denied). It is defined as the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.@ Texas Family Code Ann. Sec. 101.007 (Vernon 2002).

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Seeking Status Quo on Community Property in a Divorce


In high net worth divorce cases, there is always the risk of one spouse wasting or squandering away community property or assets including cash. In such cases consider seeking a court ordered temporary injunction to keep the community property's status quo.
The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the litigation's subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction lies within the trial court's sound discretion. On appeal, a higher court may not substitute judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. If the trial court does not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the higher court will presume all findings necessary to support the trial court's ruling and affirm if there is any legal theory supported by the record. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978). The trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports its decision. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 (citing Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 862).

The status quo is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. Transport Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (1953). The applicant must plead and prove three elements to obtain a temporary injunction: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.

To be entitled to a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead a cause of action and show a probable right to recover on that cause of action and a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2004); Argyle ISD v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2007, no pet.); Fox v. Tropical Warehouses, Inc., 121 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2003, no pet.). A probable right of recovery is shown by alleging a cause of action and presenting evidence tending to sustain it. See Argyle ISD, 234 S.W.3d at 236; Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857. An injury is irreparable if damages would not adequately compensate the injured party or if they cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; see also Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993); Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857. A Status quo is defined as the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. App.CAustin 2000, no pet.) (quoting Transport Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (1953)).

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Friday, January 16, 2009

Using An Expert Witness In Divorce Property Litigation


In Divorce lawsuits and disputes, and just as with any civil litigation or lawsuit in the State of Texas, Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 702; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. 1995). Rule 702 provides: "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 702. The testimony must be relevant and based on a reliable foundation. See Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 727-28 (Tex. 1998); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 554. Once the opposing party objects to proffered expert testimony, the proponent of the witness' testimony bears the burden of demonstrating its admissibility. See Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.

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