Intentinal Infliction of Emotional Distress in Texas

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In rare instances nowadays, to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish that:

(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;

(2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous;

(3) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and

(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe.

See the case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 740-41 (Tex. 2003); Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d 928, 929 (Tex. 2000). In Texas, intentional infliction of emotional distress is a “gap-filler” tort, created to permit recovery in “those rare instances in which a defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress.” Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004). In other words, it was never intended as an easier and broader way to allege claims already addressed by our civil and criminal laws, nor was it intended to replace or duplicate existing statutory or common law remedies. See Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 817-18 (Tex. 2005); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 144 S.W.3d at 447.

Thus, if the gravamen of a plaintiff’s complaint is another tort, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim will not succeed regardless of whether the plaintiff succeeds on, or even makes the alternate claim. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 144 S.W.3d at 448; see also Creditwatch, Inc., 157 S.W.3d at 817 (“As [the plaintiff’s] complaints are covered by other statutory remedies, she cannot assert them as intentional infliction claims just because those avenues may now be barred.”); Louis v. Mobil Chem. Co., 254 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. filed) (“Where the gravamen of the complaint is really another tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress is unavailable.”); Conley v. Driver, 175 S.W.3d 882, 887 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (explaining that intentional infliction of emotional distress tort “cannot be used as an alternative to some other, more conventional tort [that] fits the facts but might be subject to some structural impediment”).

Where does this leave this cause of action? Well in essence, and in Texas anyway, it should stand alone as a single cause of action.