Employment Discrimination in Texas

Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (the Act), an employer may not discriminate against or discharge an employee based on “race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age.” Texas Labor Code § 21.051. By adopting the Act, the Legislature “intended to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases.” Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003)). Therefore, courts look to federal law to interpret the Act’s provisions. Id.; Wal-Mart, 121 S.W.3d at 739; Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. 2001); M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. 2000).

To establish a violation of the Act, a plaintiff must show that he or she was:

(1) a member of the class protected by the Act,

(2) qualified for his or her employment position,

(3) terminated by the employer, and

(4) treated less favorably than similarly situated members of the opposing class.

See Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d at 917; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).

Texas courts have held that stray remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination and statements made remotely in time by someone not directly connected with termination decisions do not raise a fact issue about the reason for termination. See M.D. Anderson, 28 S.W.3d at 25; see also Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 607-08 (5th Cir. 2007); Elgaghil v. Tarrant County Junior Coll., 45 S.W.3d 133, 140 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

Statements and remarks may serve as evidence of discrimination only if they are:

(1) related to the employee’s protected class,

(2) close in time to the employment decision,

(3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision, and

(4) related to the employment decision at issue. Arismendez, 493 F.3d at 608.

In determining whether the individual making the remark had authority over the employment decision, consideration is not limited to statements by the person who officially made the decision. Id. at 608; Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2000). Discriminatory reamrks by a person other than the decision-maker may be imputed to an employer if evidence indicates that the person in question possessed leverage or exerted influence over the decision-maker. Russell, 235 F.3d at 226-27.