Texas PreMarital Agreements

In Texas pre-marital or pre-nuptial agreements are enforceable so long as it is in writing and is signed by both parties. The agreement is enforceable even though without consideration, unlike a deed where consideration is necessary. Under Section 4.001 of the Texas Family Code, a 'Premarital Agreement" is a written agreement between prospective spouses in contemplation of marriage and is effective upon marriage.

The parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:

(1) the rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;

(2) the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property;

(3) the disposition of property on separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;

(4) the modification or elimination of spousal support;

(5) the making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement;

(6) the ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance policy;

(7) the choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and

(8) any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty.

Representing Yourself Pro Se in a Divorce or Famil Law Case

There are advantages and disadvantages in representing oneself pro se in a divorce proceeding or family law case such as a custody dispute. Some of the immediate advantages include the following:

1. Not having to pay an attorney for legal fees;
2. Ability to make your own legal arguments; and
3. Some sympathy from the court or jury;

Although as simple as it may seem, the disadvantages may outweigh its advantages. For example, although the process may seem simple, legal procedure is fraught with complex meaning and ramifications. Frequently, the question arises, "do I really need a lawyer...?"
On most cases, the answer is generally yes. Courts are also not easily inclined to have sympathy on pro se litigants. As one court put it, "While we have compassion for the plight of the pro se litigant attempting to follow the rules of legal procedure and substantive laws, and therefore construe pro se pleadings and briefs liberally, we must still hold appellant to the same standard as a licensed attorney, requiring that he follow those same rules and laws." Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184‑85 (Tex. 1978); Cooper v. Circle Ten Council Boy Scouts of Am., 254 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant represented by counsel. Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d at 185; Cooper, 254 S.W.3d at 693.

On one occasion, a client indicated that at first they thought that a lawyer was not necessary in handling a simple state tax collection matter. At the end, the matter ended up to be a $250,000 judgment against the client. Although on some cases such as on uncontested matters, representing oneself pro se may be cost effective, however in most situations it behooves a client to get good legal representation to avoid the legal pitfalls of legal procedure and law.

Writ of Mandamus in Family Law Cases

On occasion a trial court may abuse its discretion with respect to rulings on family law cases so as to warrant an immediate review by a higher court. This process is called a writ of mandamus against the trial court judge making the incorrect ruling or abuse of discretion.

To be entitled to the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus, the relator must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and he has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in the resolution of factual matters, the court of appeals may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and may not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Therefore, the relator must establish that the trial court could have reached only one decision. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. An abuse of discretion does not exist if the trial court bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports the trial court's decision. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro‑Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1997); Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. 1993).

Appellate courts do not generally overrule trial court rulings, especially when conflicting evidence are submitted by opposing parties. Such was the case in the recent ruling by the 14th Court of Appeals last February in the case of In Re John W. Small who asked the higher court to compel the presiding judge of County Court at Law No. 1 of Galveston County, to set aside her October 31, 2008 order finding relator in contempt for failing to pay court-ordered temporary spousal support to real party in interest, Murriah S. McMaster, and to to reverse her November 1, 2005 order awarding temporary spousal support to McMaster. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, writ of mandamus was denied.

International Family Law: Necessity of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Texas

In international family law cases, parents frequently run into jurisdictional issues as to which court, i.e., Texas or an international court has jurisdiction to hear a custody case. Whether in a divorce, modification or enforcement action, in Texas the court hearing the custody case must have subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 152.201 of the Texas Family Code, - INITIAL CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION.

states as follows:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 152.204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:

(1) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;

(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under Section 152.207 or 152.208, and:
(A) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting

as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence;

and
(B) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection,

training, and personal relationships;

(3) all courts having jurisdiction under Subdivision (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 152.207 or 152.208; or

(4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in

Subdivision (1), (2), or (3).

(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.

(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.

In the case of ANA MARIA TARQUIS ALFONSO v. MICHAEL SKADDEN, the courts delt with the issue of whether the Texas court had subject matter jurisdiction in a divorce decree that was sought to be enforced four years after an alleged default.

The fact of the case are as follows:

Michael Skadden and Ana Maria Tarquis Alfonso were married in Houston in 1991. In March 1999, Tarquis filed for divorce in Spain, and one month later Skadden (a Houston lawyer affiliated with a Madrid firm) filed for divorce in Harris County, Texas. Each of the parties claimed they were not served in the other’s suit, although Skadden appeared by attorney in Spain and Tarquis was served by publication. When Tarquis failed to appear in Texas, the trial court granted default, divided the property, named both parents managing conservators of their only child, entered a standard possession order, and ordered Skadden to pay child support. By contrast, the Spanish court granted sole custody to Tarquis, denied visitation to Skadden on the basis he had no relationship with the child (Skadden admits he has not seen their child since 1998), and also ordered Skadden to pay child support.

Four years and three months after the Texas decree was signed, Skadden sought to enforce it. Tarquis answered and argued the 1999 judgment was void due to lack of personal jurisdiction because she had not been served, and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Texas was not the child’s home state. The district judge — who had heard the 1999 case as an associate judge and recommended the divorce decree — reviewed the 1999 file, heard evidence, and then denied enforcement, finding the absence of an appointed ad litem or statement of evidence rendered service by publication improper. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 244.

While Skadden argued he never had proper notice or a hearing in Spain, his recognition of those proceedings established that Spanish courts had not declined jurisdiction. The trial court refused to enforce the Harris County decree on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with the trial court. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and can be raised at any time. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358 (Tex. 2004). Because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the custody provisions in the 1999 divorce decree, it properly refused to enforce that portion of the decree.